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the  UK   Information   and  Communication   Technology   (ICT)   sector,   BT   is   taking   a   strategic   approach   to  
outsourcing: this has resulted in a rapid and substantial  increase in the outsourcing and offshoring of ICT  
development,  maintenance  and   support   contracts.  Each  and   every   outsourcing   decision   could   have  major  
security,   legal,   regulatory   and   contractual   impacts.   It   is   generally   recognised   that   risks   are   likely   to   be  
compounded when outsourcing to companies based in countries  that have different political,  economic and  
cultural environments and, subsequently, that security assessments must be augmented to address this. However,  
difficulties   can   occur  with   the   ongoing   ownership   of   responsibilities   for   outsourced   information   and   its  





framework  and  integrated  into decision­making processes  for outsourcing ICT contracts.  Specific   tools  and  
techniques have been developed to ensure that engagement with stakeholders is effective and timely, that risks  




consolidated   from across   the  business   to  create a   full   picture  of   information  confidentiality,   integrity  and  








Security risk management, security risk assessments, outsourcing, offshoring, Residual Risk Assessment 
Method (IS1), confidentiality, integrity, availability, security requirements, Critical National Infrastructure, 
information assurance, compliance, governance, audit.
INTRODUCTION 
Outsourcing,  offshoring   and  globalisation   are  no   longer  management   consulting   “buzzwords”  but  business 
realities   that   present  many   challenges   for   the   security   community.   Every   outsourcing   decision   can   have 
significant security, legal, regulatory and contractual implications. Risk profiles will change when outsourcing to 
companies   based   in   countries   that   have   different   political,   economic   and   cultural   environments.   Further 
challenges are presented by a dramatic increase in the number of business processes earmarked for outsourcing: 
each of   these   requires   security  analysis  and many disparate   sources  of   information  must  be   identified  and 
consolidated   to   create   appropriate   inputs   to   facilitate   effective   analysis.  BT   is   one   of   the  world’s   leading 
providers   of   communications   solutions   serving   customers   in  Europe,   the  Americas   and  Asia  Pacific.     Its 
principal activities include networked IT services, local, national and international telecommunications services, 




(ICT)   environment   and   integrated   into   decision­making   processes   for   outsourcing   work.   New   tools   and 
techniques have been developed to ensure that engagement with stakeholders is effective and timely, that risks 
and   requirements   are   identified   and   understood,   and   that   risk  mitigation   and  management   strategies   are 
implemented within appropriate compliance and governance frameworks. The new methods are based on the UK 
Government’s Infosec Standard No. 1: Residual Risk Assessment Method (IS1) (GCHQ/CESG, n.d.) .




















In terms of relative importance, cost reduction still a primary factor but the strategic reshaping of business is 
now far more important. Some believe that we have reached the end of the cost reduction phase and businesses 
are  looking  for  more  sophisticated  approaches  and  innovation  to  drive  more  value  and  revenue  from IT 
(Knights, 2006). Gartner predicts that global offshoring spending on IT services will rise to a total of £28.6bn by 
2007 (Underwood, 2006). It is further reported that 81% of UK companies plan to increase offshore outsourcing 
over the next three years (DTI, 2005). India is currently the preferred choice for offshoring, accounting for 75% 







• industry/sector   collaboration,   for   example,   the   National   Association   of   Software   and   Service 
Companies (NASSCOM) (NASSCOM, 2005).















since  2003 and   this   includes  a   comprehensive   set  of  baseline   security   requirements   that  can  be  enhanced, 
depending on the nature of the information assets concerned.






























suitable   levels   of   security   can   be   implemented   and  maintained   (indeed,   levels   of   protection   and  security 



































Table 1: Changing information risks
         Lifecycle   
            Stage
Info 
Attribute
Design Development Test Operate
Confidentiality Low Medium Medium High
Integrity Medium Medium Medium High
Availability Low Low Medium High
Such  decomposition  will   create   the   granularity   needed   to   identify   specific   levels   of   security   for   different 
lifecycle stages, for example, application development using ‘dummy’ or ‘anonymised’ data may require less 
rigorous security measures than operational stages using ‘live’ customer data. 
It is also important  to address security throughout the contract  lifecycle as well,  from initiation through to 
contract termination, and this can add a further dimension to Table 1. The UK National Infrastructure Security 
Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) has issued guidelines to help build security into contracts, breaking the lifecycle 
into 14 distinct stages (NISCC, 2006)  . Specific contractual information should be gathered for security risk 
assessments, namely to determine the type of access profiles that third party personnel will have to corporate 
and customer  information,  for  example,  powerful  ‘root’ access for  support  functions  versus  ‘standard’ user 
access for help desk activity. 
Granularity  in  assessments  facilitates  the  identification  of  cost-effective  security  solutions.  However,  an 
appropriate level of granularity must be identified and weighed against the cost and usefulness to business-























• regulatory  and  legal   requirements,   for  example,  UK Data  Protection  Act,  US Sarbanes  Oxley,  UK 
Telecoms Strategic Review;
• customer   security   requirements   –   individual,   company   and  UK  Government,   including   imported 
privacy markings;
• CNI requirements;








difficult.  Many sources of   requirements  and system security   information  from across  the business  must  be 
identified and consolidated to create the ‘big picture’ of information security attributes for any given system or 
application. From BT’s perspective, the volume of target systems and applications for offshoring that require 
security   assessments   also   presents   another   challenge   for   the  mix.   Speed   of   sourcing   can   be   a   business 
differentiator   and  agile   security   responses   are   required.   It  must   also   be   remembered   that   one­off   security 
assessments are insufficient and planned lifecycle and contract changes over time provide an effective trigger for 



















range   servers   and   end­user  workstations   to  HP  (Todd   et   al,   2006)    .  At   the   point   at  which   the   security 
















IS1  is   sufficiently   flexible   to   cover  most   levels   of   security   risk   likely   to   be   encountered  within   strategic 


































Table 2: Red-Amber-Green status
RAG Status Description
GREEN SAFE to offshore providing baseline security controls are in place and maintained. 
AMBER Additional mitigation factors/options may be possible to reduce the RAG to 
GREEN; more detailed IS1 analysis required.
RED UNSAFE to offshore. Additional mitigation is unlikely to be sufficient to reduce 
residual risk to an acceptable level.
A ‘top­down’ approach was implemented and the IS1 front­end spreadsheet quickly evolved into a   tool  for 
capturing and collating the wide range of  data inputs needed  to perform IS1 outsourcing assessments  with 
increasing levels of granularity  (Colwill & Gray, 2006)   . Initial inputs are taken from the ICT programmes 
during a ‘triage’ stage analysis and these are augmented with input from security professionals in the next stages 
of   analysis.   Information   from   a   variety   of   business   impact   analysis   and   security   profiling   processes   are 
consolidated,   together with legal and regulatory requirements,   to create a  common understanding of Impact 
Levels (consistent with IS1 definitions) based on data value, sensitivity and potential impacts inside and outside 
BT. At the same time, inputs relating to other IS1 factors such as vendor environment and potential attacker 
populations   are   gathered   or   estimated.  The   top­down   approach   provides   early   indications   on     “go/no   go” 
situations and areas where further investigations are required – see Figure 3. 
‘Triage’ Questions
Detailed IS1 report with 
bespoke mitigation 
recommendations
Is the answer 
YES to any of 
the questions?
Initial Analysis




ACCEPTABLE level of risk –
Safe to Outsource with baseline 
security controls in place 
UNACCEPTABLE level of risk –





Is the result 
RED, AMBER
or GREEN?
ACCEPTABLE level of risk –
Safe to Outsource with baseline 
security controls in place
UNACCEPTABLE level of risk –


















































speedy   assessments   and   to   provide   a   single   source   for   use   by   the   security   community.  Extracts   into   this 
supporting database from key business databases are also now automated.
The limitations of the front­end tool should be recognised as it is designed as a decision aid for preliminary 











































compliance   teams,   ICT programme directors,  vendor  management   teams  and  vendors   themselves.  Business 
processes have been improved to create better, timely, linkage between security and ICT programmes. There has 
been a significant increase in security awareness and the potential impacts of security failures, including the 










• Sustainability of 
attack
• Education levels 
• Intelligence   
gathering/targeting




• Access to training, 
manuals & proc.s
• IA skill levels








• Risk of detection
Other factors
• Levels of need






































































Outsourcing   business   drivers   have   stimulated   innovation   and   automation   for   collecting   input   for   risk 
assessments, performing the calculations and disseminating the results. The involvement of stakeholders at every 
stage was a crucial success factor to gain commitment and to improve the quality of input and ownership of 
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